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Political parties in Africa are known to forge clientelist rather than
programmatic ties to voters, but this does not necessarily mean that parties
reward strong ties with local constituents. Research in Nigeria suggests that
lawmakers seeking to advance their political careers are incentivised to
direct public resources to senior party elites, starving needed development
funds in favour of advancing private interests.
With the third wave of democratisation, parliamentary institutions in many African
countries were re-introduced after long bouts of military rule, or strengthened after
taking a subordinate role in one-party regimes. Political aspirants now compete
both within political parties and at the polls for a seat in parliament and, often, MP
turnover rates are high. Competition is thus real, but especially situated within
parties themselves.
High turnover raises questions as to how parliaments gain strength vis-à-vis
incumbents – who certainly do tend to stay in power – and how MPs increase their
electoral prospects. In this post, I focus mainly on the latter question, drawing on a
recent paper on MP re-election in Nigeria in the context of reputations for
clientelism.
Empirical research on legislator-constituent ties in Nigeria
When asked, many African MPs stress the importance of constituency service for
re-election. This is the case in Nigeria, but also in a wide range of other countries
(see Anja Osei’s cross-national research on African parliaments). Most argue that
what they do in parliament, including their law-making and oversight activities, is
not on the minds of the electorate, which rather wishes for MPs to bring
development to their districts. Following this discourse, we could expect MPs to
compete in delivering development (such as roads, schools, hospitals) to gain the
favour of voters.
This idea  ts the well-known image of African ‘big men’, who display personal
wealth while being respected and celebrated in the community for sharing their
riches. While familiar, the image is not without its  aws. Empirical research on MPs
– as reviewed in the paper – shows that while MPs in some countries do devote
substantial attention to constituency service (e.g. Kenya, Tanzania), MPs in other
countries shirk on this task (e.g. Ghana, Uganda). In Nigeria, it is particularly hard to
reconcile the image of development-bringing MPs with high citizen contempt of
parliament (see Afrobarometer data) and a continuous stream of media reports
challenging MPs’ self-serving and corrupt behaviour.
My own empirical research further demonstrates weak legislator-constituent ties in
Nigeria, stemming from the fact that political parties do not incentivise their
candidates to bring development to their districts. Building on a dataset I compiled
of 8  National Assembly MPs (2015-19), I  rst of all found that most MPs did aim
to either retain their seat in the 2019 elections or vie for new elected positions. This
is important as it indicates that MPs behaviour can be understood as electorally
motivated and that a term in o ce is not just about maximising rents before quickly
leaving.
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Second, I found that the chances of emerging as the party candidate for a seat are
not in uenced by MPs’ attention to their districts through their activities in
parliament. Bills and motions that target constituencies are a commonly used
indicator in comparative politics to measure lawmakers’ personal vote-seeking
among constituents. In Nigeria, however, MPs are not rewarded for this legislative
attention.
Third, and arguably more important in contexts of poverty, Nigerian lawmakers
barely bring back development to their districts. While they have among the most
sizable resources in terms of constituency allowances and constituency
development funds (CDF) compared to other developing countries, these resources
are rarely used to bene t citizens in general. I rely on data on the execution of CDF
projects from a Nigerian NGO, BudgiT, to show that MPs show great reluctance to
bring projects to completion, that projects get dragged on for years, and that if
projects are completed, the costs often do not align with the end-result.
Where does the power lie?
Of course, money remains important in elections, especially in Nigeria, and MPs
vying for re-election need sizable sums. But who bene ts? I argue that most
bene ts accrue to senior political elites or ‘godfathers’. They largely fund the
campaigns of candidates of their choosing, and in return receive access to state
coffers. Most embezzlement serves these elites, as well as the candidates
themselves.
Other bene ciaries are party clients, who expect to pro t from MP disbursements in
return for providing electoral support. Interestingly – and in contrast to Kenya, for
example – most CDF projects in Nigeria actually cater to private interests rather
than being aimed at public infrastructure. ‘Empowerment’ programmes that
distribute motorcycles, sewing machines and so forth are run by MPs themselves,
which allows them to reward their supporters.
The  ndings are important for debates on democratisation and institutionalism. For
one, since Nigeria’s transition into the Fourth Republic in 1999, power remains
concentrated in the hands of senior political leaders regardless of electoral
competition. Even the use of primaries, which in other contexts has been
associated with more competition and the emergence of leaders with mass ties,
does not undermine the strength of godfathers. Furthermore, the use of Single
Member Districts, often argued to promote strong lawmaker-constituent relations,
does not foster these ties in the country. Institutional differences may of course still
matter and, for example, explain differences between countries like Kenya and
Nigeria, but this requires further research.
The  ndings also contribute to debates on African political parties. To emerge as a
candidate in Nigeria, it is key to cater to the interests of party stalwarts and foot
soldiers, while personal relations with voters matter less. Parties are often  rmly in
control of their districts, and as long as no major factional rifts take place, as with
the emergence of the ruling All Progressives Congress party, they control the
outcome: ‘80-85% vote for the party, whether they like you or not’ (MP interview).
This nuances claims of party weakness in Africa and the view that politicians rely
on personal relations to voters. Emerging as the party candidate is tricky – not
because aspirants fail to serve constituents’ high demands, but likely due to
competitors outbidding each other to reach political o ce, and senior elites
managing the process to support loyal candidates. At the same time, it prevents
candidates from forming alternative power bastions.
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